

On Plato & His Doctrine

De Platone et eius Dogmate

Apuleius
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BOOK THE FIRST. ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

HABITUDE OF BODY gave a surname to Plato; for he was first called Aristocles; and his father is said to have been Aristo. Moreover, Perictione, the daughter of Glaucus, was his mother; and from both his nobility was very illustrious. For his father Aristo drew his origin from Neptune through Codrus; and his maternal blood was derived from the most wise Solon, who was the founder of the Attic laws. There are also those who relate that Plato descended from a more august conception, since a certain spectre of Apollo had connexion with Perictione.

He was likewise born in the month which is called by the Athenians Thargelion [i.e. April]; and on the same day in which Latona is said to have brought forth Apollo and Diana, in the island Delos. We learn that Socrates was born the day before him. An admirable dream also of Socrates is related; for he appeared to himself to have seen the offspring of a swan fly from the altar, which in the Academy is sacred to Cupid, and seat itself in his breast; and that afterwards that swan extended its wings towards the heavens, alluring the ears both of men and Gods by its harmonious voice. While Socrates was narrating this dream to an assembly of men, Aristo brought the boy Plato to the master Socrates [as a pupil]. And as soon as Socrates beheld him, and saw from his outward form what the recondite nature was of his mind, he said, "This, O my friends, was the swan which flew from the altar of Cupid in the Academy." Plato therefore being such a man, and produced by such parents, not only surpassed the virtues of heroes, but also possessed powers which resembled those of the Gods. For Speusippus, who was enabled to speak of him from domestic documents, praises the acuteness of his genius in learning when he was a boy, and the admirable

modesty of his disposition, and asserts that the first period of his adolescence was imbued with labour and the love of study, and testifies that there was an increase of these and other virtues in him when he was a man. Glauco and Adimantus were also his brothers from the same parents. In the first elements of literature he had for his master Dionysius; but in wrestling he was instructed by the Argive Aristo, in which exercise he made such a proficiency, that he contended in wrestling in the Pythian and Isthmian games. He likewise did not despise the art of painting. He rendered himself capable of writing tragedies and dithyrambics. And now, being elated with confidence in [the goodness of] his verses, he would have professed himself a contender in tragedy, if Socrates had not expelled from his mind that abject desire, and inserted in him the love of true renown. And at first, indeed, he had been imbued with the doctrines of Heraclitus; but, when he had given himself to Socrates, he not only surpassed the other Socratics in acuteness and learning, but also illustrated by labour and elegance the wisdom which he had received from Socrates; by labour, in his endeavours to vindicate it, and by elegance, in adding greatly to its dignity, by the gracefulness and majesty of his words. But after the death of Socrates, when he had explored from whence he should make a further proficiency, he betook himself to the discipline of Pythagoras. And though he saw it was furnished with accurate and magnificent doctrine, yet he was more desirous of imitating the Pythagorean abstinence and chastity.

Because, likewise, he perceived that the genius of the Pythagoreans was assisted by other disciplines, he went to Theodorus, the Cyrenean, that he might learn geometry, and to Egypt for the purpose of being instructed in astronomy, and also that he might become acquainted with the rites of the prophets. He also came again to Italy, and was a follower of the Pythagoreans, Eurytus, the Tarentine, and the senior

Archytas. And he intended to have gone to the Indians and the Magi, but was prevented at that time from carrying his intention into effect by the Asiatic war. Hence, having diligently applied himself to the discoveries of Parmenides and Zeno, he so filled his writings with the dogmas of all these men, each of which is admirable, that he was the first who united philosophy, so as to make it a whole, consisting of three parts, and demonstrated that those parts are alternately necessary to each other, and that they are so far from opposing, that they afford each other mutual assistance. For though these members of philosophy were taken by him from different sources, viz the natural from the Heraclitean, the intellectual from the Pythagorean, and the moral from the fountain itself of Socrates, yet he formed one body from all these, which was, as it were, his proper offspring. Since, likewise, the leaders of these sects of philosophy delivered their dogmas to their auditors in a rude and unfinished state, he rendered them both perfect and admirable, through polishing them by [scientific] reasoning, and investing them with the most graceful garb of august diction. Many of his auditors of each sex flourished in philosophy. The patrimony which he left consisted of a small garden, joining to the Academy, two servants, a bowl from which he made libations to the Gods, and only as much gold as he wore in his ear when he was a boy, as an indication of his nobility. Moreover, certain malignant persons revile his three journeys to Sicily, in consequence of not properly discriminating the different opinions on this subject. But he first went to Sicily for the sake of [natural] history, that he might know the nature of Etna, and of the burning eruptions of that concave mountain. His second journey was undertaken at the request of Dionysius, in order that he might assist the Syracusans, and that he might learn the municipal laws of that province. And by his third journey he restored Dion to his country from

which he was flying, having obtained his pardon from Dionysius.

We shall here, however, begin to narrate what ordinances (which in Greek may be called 'dogmata', dogmas), he delivered for the advantage of mankind, and also what were his doctrines pertaining to the conduct of life, to intellection, and enunciation. For because he was the first who asserted that the three parts of philosophy accorded with each other, we shall also discuss each of these separately, beginning from natural philosophy. Plato therefore thought that there were three principles of things, God, matter, and the forms of things, which he calls ideas, and which are incomplete, not yet formed, and not distinguished by any species, or signification of quality. But the following were his opinions of God, that [in the first place], he is incorporeal. For he says, "That he alone is uncircumscribed, and the generator of things, attracting all things to himself, blessed, and beatific, most excellent, in want of nothing, and himself imparting all things." He likewise asserts, "That he is celestial, ineffable, and incapable of being named, and in his own words, 'appeton', 'anatonomaston'; whose nature it is difficult to discover, and when found cannot be enunciated to many." These are the words of Plato: It is difficult to discover God, and impossible when found to enunciate him to the multitude. But he says, "That matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, that it is neither fire, nor water, nor any one of the elements or perfect principles; but that it is the first of all things, capacious of figures, and subject to formation; and that God the artificer fashioned the whole of it, while it was yet rude, and deprived of the quality of figuration." And he calls it infinite, because it has a boundless magnitude. For that which is infinite has an indistinct termination of magnitude; and hence, since it is without bound, it may very properly seem to be indefinite. He neither admits, however, that it is corporeal,

nor indeed incorporeal. But he does not think that it is body, because every body possesses a certain form. And it cannot be said to be without body, because nothing incorporeal exhibits the appearance of body; but he says, " That it may be considered as corporeal in capacity only, and when viewed with the eye of reason." Hence, its existence cannot be apprehended by its sensible energies alone, nor yet by opinion alone. For bodies, on account of their remarkable evidence, may be known by a similar [i.e. by a manifest] perception. But things which have not a corporeal evidence, can alone be perceived by the discursive energies of reason. Hence, also, the ambiguous nature of matter can Only be apprehended by adulterated opinion. But ideas, i.e. the forms of all things, are simple and eternal, yet not corporeal. From the number of these, however, those which divinity assumed, are the exemplars of things which are, or will be; and among these exemplars, there cannot be more than one archetype of each species. The forms likewise and figures of every thing that is generated, are stamped after the manner of wax with the impression of those exemplars.

He also says, "That there are two essences, through which all things and the world itself are generated; one of which is alone conceived by the energies of reason, but the other may be the subject of sensible inspection." That essence, however, which is comprehended by the eyes of the mind, is always found to subsist with invariable sameness, to be equal and similar to itself, and to be that which truly is. But the other essence, which he says rises into existence, and perishes, is to be apprehended by sensible and irrational opinion. And as the former is said to have a true and real subsistence, so it may be asserted of the latter that it does not truly exist. The first substances also, or essences, are, God, intellect, the forms of things, and soul. But the second essences are all the things that are formed from the first, which are generated, and

which derive their origin from their exemplar of the superior essence. These also are capable of being changed and converted, are of a decaying nature, and fugacious like a river. Further still, that intelligible essence of which I have spoken, because it is firmly established, causes every thing which is predicated of it to be full of stable reason, and [incontrovertible] faith. But of the sensible essence, which is, as it were, the shadow and image of the former essence, the reasonings also, and the language employed in speaking of it, are of an unstable nature.

Plato likewise asserts, "That matter is the principle of all bodies, and that it is stamped with the impression of forms." Hence, the first elements, fire and water, earth and air, are generated. Which if they are elements ought to be simple, and not copulated like syllables by a mutual connexion; which happens to be the case with those things, the essence of which consists of a manifold coalition of powers. And these being without order, and confusedly mixed, are disposed into order, and bounded by number and measure by that God who is the fabricator of the world. These from many elements were reduced to one thing. And fire, indeed, air, and water, derived their origin and principle from the [scalene] triangle, whose angles are not equal to those of a right-angled triangle. But earth was produced from right-angled triangles, two of the sides of which are equal. And three species indeed were produced from the former figure, viz the pyramid, the octaedron, and the icosaedron. The sphere and the pyramid contain in themselves the figure of fire; but the octaedron was destined to be the figure of air, and the icosaedron of water. The right-angled isosceles triangle produces from itself a square, and the square generates from itself the cube, which is the figure peculiar to earth. Hence, Plato assigns the moveable form of the pyramid to fire, because the celerity of the one appears to be similar to the agitation of the other. The

octangular sphere [i.e. the sphere consisting of octaedrons], ranks as the second in velocity; and he assigned this figure to air, which is the second after fire in levity and velocity. The twenty-angled sphere [or the sphere consisting of icosaedrons], ranks in the third place; and the form of this, which is fluid and voluble, appeared to be more similar to water. The figure consisting of cubes remains, which, because it is unadapted to motion, is not incongruously attributed to the stability of earth.

Plato says that other principles may also be found, which are known either to divinity, or to the mail who is dear to the Gods. But these visible bodies of animals, and of inanimate natures, consist of the first elements, fire and water, air and earth, severally joined together. The whole world, likewise, was produced from all water, all fire, the whole of air, and all earth; and not only no part of these is left external to the universe, but likewise no power which the world possesses can be found out of it. But these elements are from themselves, adapted and connected within themselves. And hence, there is an analogy between fire and air, water and earth [by which they are connected together]; so that as fire is united to air by alliance, in like manner water is by affinity conjoined to earth. Hence, likewise, the world is one, and all things are contained in it; nor is any place left in which there might be another world, nor do any elements remain, from which the body of another world might be formed. In addition to these things also, perpetual youth, and incorruptible health, were imparted to it. On this account, nothing was left external to it, by which its nature might be corrupted. And even though something of this kind had remained, it could not have injured it; since it was so constituted and arranged within itself in every part, that things of an hostile and contrary nature should have no power to injure its nature and order. Hence, by the fabricating divinity, the figure of a

beautiful and perfect sphere was imparted to the most perfect and beautiful world, in order that it might not be indigent of any thing, but that it might contain all things, covering and comprehending them in itself; and might be excellent and admirable, similar to, and in concord with itself. Hence, also, since it contains these seven local motions, viz progression and regression, to the right hand and to the left, upward and downward, and the motion of bodies that revolve in a circle; removing from the world the six former, he alone left to it a circular motion, as peculiarly adapted to wisdom and prudence. And at one time, indeed, he says, " That the world is without a beginning; but at another, that it has an origin, and was generated." But he asserts, " That there was no beginning and origin of it, because it always had an existence; and it appears to have been generated, because the nature and essence of the universe consists of things which are allotted the quality of being generated, or rising into existence." Hence, too, the world is tangible and visible, and is obvious to the corporeal senses. Because, however, God was the cause of its generation, on this account it will always exist with an immortal duration. But the soul of all animals is not corporeal, nor will perish when liberated from the body; and it is also more ancient than every thing which is generated. On this account, it predominates and rules over those things of which it is allotted the providential charge; and it is always moved, and moved by itself, and is the source of motion to other things, which are naturally immoveable and sluggish. But that celestial soul which is the fountain of all souls, and is most excellent and most wise, is the producing cause of the virtues, and is, according to Plato, subservient to God the fabricator, and prepared to execute all his commands.

The essence, however, of this intellect [i.e. of this soul], consists of numbers and modes, the augments being doubled

and multiplied, and the increments being obtained both by themselves and extrinsically: and hence it comes to pass that the world is moved musically and melodiously. There are also two natures [or essences] of things. And of these, one pertains to things which may be seen by the eyes, and touched by the hand, and which Plato calls doxastic [or the object of opinion]; but the other is the object of intellect, and is dianoetic and intelligible. For pardon must be granted to novelty of words, when it serves to illustrate the obscurity of things. And the former nature indeed is mutable and easily to be perceived; but the latter, which is seen by the piercing eye of intellect, and is known and conceived by the acute energy of the reasoning power, is incorruptible, immutable, stable, and invariably and perpetually the same. Hence, also, he says, That there is a twofold method of interpretation [pertaining to them]. For that visible nature is known by a fortuitous suspicion, and which is of no long duration; but this intelligible essence is demonstrated to exist, by true, perpetual, and stable reasoning. But time is the image of eternity; since time is moved, but the nature of eternity is firm and immoveable. Time also proceeds to eternity, and may be terminated or dissolved in its immensity; if at any time this should be decreed by God the fabricator of the world. By the spaces likewise of the same time, the measures of the mundane convolution may be understood. For this is effected by the orbs of the sun and moon, and by the other stars, which we improperly call errant and wandering. For our opinions and discussions respecting their courses may lead the intellect into error.

Moreover, that disposer of things so constituted the revolutions of these [divine bodies], their risings and settings, retrogressions, stations, and progressions, that no place might be left for even the smallest error. For days, together with nights, gave completion to the spaces of months; and,

vice versa, months unfolded the circles of years. Nor could times become the, subject of computation, till these stars began to shine with celestial light; for the observation also of this computation would perish, if this ancient choir of stars should at any time stand still. For in order that the measures and revolutions of times might be known, and that the convolutions of the world might be visible, the light of the sun was enkindled; and, vice versa, the opacity of night was invented, in order that animals might obtain the rest which they [naturally] desire. Month likewise was produced, when the moon, having completed the revolution of her orb, returns to the same place from whence she departed. And the spaces of the year were terminated when the sun had passed through the four vicissitudes of the seasons, and arrived at the same signs. And the numeration of these circulations, returning into, and proceeding from, themselves, was discovered by the exercise of the reasoning power. Nevertheless, there are certain circuits of the stars, which perpetually observe a legitimate course, but which the sagacity of men can scarcely comprehend. Whence it comes to pass, that what is called the great year cannot easily be known; the period of which is completed when the choir of the wandering stars have arrived at the same boundary, and have restored to themselves a new beginning, and new journeys through the paths of the world.

Of the celestial globes, however, which are mutually connected with each other that is the supreme of all of them, which is said to proceed with an inerratic course, and the rest are comprehended in its embrace. And the first order, indeed, is inerratic, the second is given to Saturn, the third to Jupiter, Mars possesses the fourth, the fifth is attributed to Mercury, the sixth pertains to Venus, the seventh is inflamed by the journeys of the sun, and the moon measures the eighth. All the remaining spaces are occupied by the elements and [sublunary] principles. Of these, also, fire possesses the

highest place, next to it is the place of air, that of water succeeds to this, and then the globe of the earth is equally and immoveably situated in the middle place. These fires of the stars also, being fixed in spheres, proceed in perpetual and unwearied courses, and are called by Plato animal Gods. But the nature of the spheres consists of, and was fabricated from, fire. Moreover, the genera of animals are divided into three species; and of these, one consists of the nature of fire, such as we perceive the sun and moon to be, and the other stars. But the second consists of the quality of air, of which also Plato says [the bodies of] dæmons consist. And the third species coalesces from water and earth, and from these the mortal genus of bodies is divided into the terrene and terrestrial [or pedestirious]; for Plato is of opinion that 'xoixa', or pulverable natures, should thus be called. And the terrene genus, indeed, is that of trees and other fruits, which live fixed in the earth; but the terrestrial natures are those which the earth nourishes and sustains.

Plato also says, that there are three species of Gods; the first of which is that one and alone supreme God, who is super-mundane and incorporeal, and whom we have above shown to be the father and architect of this divine world. Another species of Gods is such as the stars possess, and the other divinities whom we denominate celestials. And the third species consists of those whom the ancient Romans call Medioxumi, because they are inferior to the supreme Gods, in their essence, in place, and in power, but are indeed naturally superior to men. All things, however, which are moved naturally, and on that account rightly, are under the guardian government of Providence, nor can the cause of any evil be ascribed to God. Hence Plato does not think that all things are to be referred to the decrees of Fate; for he thus defines: Providence is a divine decision, preservative of the prosperity of that for the sake of which it engages in such an

employment; but Fate is the divine law, through which the inevitable conceptions and undertakings of God are accomplished. Hence if any thing is effected by Fate, that also is accomplished by Providence; but that which is completed by Providence must not be considered to be likewise effected by Fate.

And in the first place, indeed, Providence pertains to the supreme and most excellent of all the Gods, who not only gave an orderly distribution to the celestial Gods, whom he dispersed through all the members of the world, for its preservation and ornament, but also produced Gods, who are by their nature mortaly, who might excel in wisdom other terrene animals, and whose duration might be endless. Having likewise established his own laws, he delivered to the other Gods the regulation and preservation of things which must necessarily be daily effected. Hence those Gods to whom a secondary providence pertains, so firmly retain the providential office, which it is incumbent on them to perform, that every thing which is exhibited to mortals from the heavens preserves the immutable state in which it was arranged by the paternal God. But Plato thought that daemons, whom we may call Genii and Lares, were ministrant to the Gods, the guardians of men, and also their interpreters, in what they wish to obtain from the Gods. He likewise is of opinion that all things are not to be referred to the power of Fate; but that there is something which is in our power, and something also which depends on Fortune. And he confesses, indeed, that the unlooked-for casualties of Fortune are not known by us: for something unstable and occurrent is accustomed to intervene in things which were undertaken with counsel and meditation, and which does not suffer what was intended to arrive at the desired end. And when, indeed, that impediment terminates usefully, then the thing itself is denominated felicity; but where those obstacles are of a

noxious nature, the thing is called infelicity.

Of all terrene natures, however, Providence produced nothing more excellent than man. Hence the same Plato rightly asserts that the soul of man has dominion over the body. But as, according to him, there are three parts of the soul, he says, that rationality, i.e. the best part of the soul, occupies the citadel of the head; but that the irascible part is situated in the mansion of the heart, remote from reason, to which it is obedient, conforming itself to wisdom when requisite; and that desire and appetite, which form the last part of the soul, possess the lowest seats of the belly, which are as it were certain taverns, latent privies, and inns of wickedness and luxury. This part of the soul, however, appears to have been far removed from wisdom, lest, by its troublesome vicinity, it should disturb the useful energies of reason, supernally intent on the safety of all the parts. But the whole man consists in the head and face; for prudence, and all the senses, are not contained in any other part of the body, since the other members are ministrant and subservient to the head, supplying the body with food, and other things that are requisite.

The head also was placed in the highest part, as the lord and ruler of the body, which by the providential attention of the head is defended from danger. But the organs with which the senses are furnished, for the purpose of perceiving and forming a judgment of quantities and qualities, are likewise situated in the palace of the head, in the vicinity of reason, for the purpose of assisting the truth of intellection and sensation. The senses, however, being aptly formed by nature to the perception of sensibles, possess an intelligence which is allied to them. And, in the first place, the two orbs of the eyes are transparent, and being resplendent with a certain visual light are occupied in the knowledge of light. But the

hearing which participates of an aerial nature, perceives sounds by the assistance of aerial messengers. With respect, however, to the taste, the sensations of it are of a laxer nature, and on this account are more adapted to humid and aqueous substances. The touch also, which is terrene and corporeal, perceives all such solids as are tangible and may be felt. There is likewise a separate perception of those things, which when corrupted are changed. For nature constituted the nostrils in the middle region of the face, through the two passages of which odour, accompanied by exhalation, proceeds. But conversions and mutations impart the causes of smelling, and these are perceived from corrupted, or burnt, or mouldy, or moist substances, when they are exposed to the air, and are exhaled by vapour or smoke. After this follows the judgment and sensation of odour in these; for if substances are entire, and the air is pure, such exhalations are never infectious. And these senses, indeed, are common to us with other animals. The sagacity, however, of men is better furnished; and more increased, through a divine benefit of this kind, because it possesses a more excellent hearing and sight. For through his eyes man measures the heavens, and comprehends the circulations, and risings, and settings of the stars, and their aspects; together with their significations; from whence the most beautiful and most abundant fountain of philosophy flows forth. But what gift could be bestowed on man more magnificent than the hearing, through which he may learn prudence and wisdom, and may measure the numbers of speech, and give modulation to it, and may himself become wholly harmonious in measure and number! To the tongue also was added the barrier of teeth, and the gracefulness of the mouth, which was imparted indeed to other animals, for the purpose of administering to the necessity of food, and procuring aliment for the belly. But the mouth was given to man that it might be

the storehouse of right reason and the sweetest speech, in order that language might educe those sentiments which prudence had conceived in the heart.

The habit, also, and form of the whole body are remarkable. And of the members, some have a most excellent, but others a far worse condition; but the inferior are governed by the excellency of the superior, and the former are ministrant to the nutrition of the body. Lastly, all the members, from the feet as far as to the shoulders, are obedient to the head. Moreover, the enclosures of the eyebrows defend the eyes from any thing falling from the part above them, which might disturb their tender and delicate vision. The lungs very much benefit the heart, both by their situation and nature; for when anger is inflamed, and the vertex of the heart palpitates with more rapid motions, then the lungs afford it respiration and remission, by their softness, dryness, and frigidity. But Plato says, that the spleen is not in vain situated near to the liver, in order that it might relieve its exuberance by participating its moisture and wiping away whatever is impure, and thus render it pure and uncorrupt; a thing which is especially advantageous to divination by the viscera. The belly is environed by the spiral folds of the intestines, and entangled by their connexions, in order that esculent and poculent substances may not immediately escape, but that, being detained for a while, they may of themselves afford utility and succour to animals; for, lest what is introduced into the belly should be exhausted and glide away, there is a necessary and incessant desire of food, and we are compelled to be occupied in this one thing by day and by night. The bones are covered with flesh, and are through ligaments bound to each other. Nevertheless, those parts which are the messengers of sensible perception [i.e. the instruments of the senses] are so covered with flesh, in order that the senses might not be blunted by their crassitude. Those parts also which are

connected by junctures and ligaments, for the purpose of moving themselves with more celerity and ease, are not impeded by much flesh. In the last place, survey the vertex of the head itself, and you will see that it is covered with a thin skin, and rough with hair, as a defence against the power of heat and cold.

Those members, however, are fat, which labour subdues; such, for instance, as the thighs in that part by which we sit. And what shall I say of the food itself i.e. of the chyle], which the passages proceeding from, the belly, and annexed to the fibres of the liver, disperse, when it is changed into the form of blood, in order that sagacious nature may from thence deduce it through all the members? But the passages of the veins [i.e. of the arteries] originate directly from the heart, and transfer through the spiracles of the lungs the vital spirit which they received from it, and again being distributed from that place through the members, supply with the vital spirit the whole body of the man. Hence arise those receptions and emissions of breathing, which are alternate, lest they should impede each other by their reciprocal encounters. The qualities, however, of those veins [i.e. arteries] are different, which proceed directly from the neck, through the inward parts of the kidneys, for the purposes of procreation, and which it is certain are received in the place where the groin is situated, and again. depart from thence, as the generative seminary of human nature.

But when Plato says that the whole body consists of various substances, he is of opinion that it is composed, in the first place, of fire and water, and the other elements; in the next place, of similar parts of flesh, bone, blood, and the rest of such like parts; and, in the third place, of dissimilar and different members, i.e. of the head, the belly, and dissimilar joints. Hence also the substance which consists of the simple

elements, if that which is necessary to life is externally supplied, in such a way as is adapted to the nature of each particular, preserves in this case the quality and temperament of the body; but increases the strength of such parts as consist of similars, and nourishes the beauty of those which, as we before observed, are dissimilar to each other. At the same time likewise that equality of the moist and the dry, the hot and the cold, imparts health, strength, and beauty; just as that badly-tempered and immoderate mixture, both of particulars and generals, being vitiated, corrupts the animal by a rapid death.

Plato also says, that the soul is tripartite; and that the first part of it is reason; the second anger, or irritability; and the third appetite, which we may likewise call cupidity. But health, strength, and beauty, are then present with the animal, when reason governs the whole soul; when the two inferior parts are obedient to it, and anger and cupidity, being concordant with each other, desire nothing, and excite nothing, which reason judges to be useless. When the parts of the soul are thus attempered to equability, the body is not subdued by any perturbation. But when the parts are inordinate and unequal among themselves, then they introduce to the body disease, debility, and deformity; viz when cupidity subdues and subjugates to itself the irascible part and reason; or when anger, being more fierce, vanquishes reason, that mistress and queen, though cupidity is obedient to her, and is quiet. He also says, that the disease of the soul is folly, and this he divides into two parts; one of which he denominates ignorance, but the other insanity. He adds, that the disease of ignorance arises from superb boasting, when a man falsely pretends to be learned in, and to have a scientific knowledge of, things of which he is ignorant; but that fury usually happens from depraved custom and a libidinous life; and that this is called insanity, which the

vicious quality of the body manifests, when those things which are prepared to be subservient to reason, in the head, are prevented from being so by unseasonable compression. He likewise says, that man is then perfect, when the soul and body are equally conjoined, accord with, and correspond to, each other; so that the strength of the mind is not inferior to the prevailing powers of the body. But the body is then increased by natural augmentations, when the salubriously procured portion of health never exceeds the quantity of necessary food; nor health is crushed by the magnitude of external labours, nor by the burden of food, either immoderately introduced, or not digested and distributed through the body in such a way as is requisite. For then the joints and the members retain the measure and force of their proper vigour, when that which is introduced for the preservation of the whole body is distributed into all the parts, so as to be equally adapted to each. But when this by no means takes place, the destruction of the body follows.

BOOK THE SECOND. ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

O SON FAUSTINUS, the summit of moral philosophy is the knowledge of the methods by which it is possible to arrive at a blessed life. And I will show you how this life, which is the end of [human] good, is to be obtained, according to Plato. He asserts, therefore, that of good one kind is transcendently excellent and primary, but that the other kinds are good through participation. And those things which are primarily good, are the supreme God, and that intellect which he calls nous. After these, those kinds of good subsist, which flow from the fountain of the former, and these are the virtues of the soul, viz prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude; but prudence among all these is pre-eminent. He ranks temperance as the second to this in number and power;

justice follows these; and fortitude is the fourth. He also considers this to be the difference in the kinds of good, that some are essentially divine, primary, and simple; but others are human, and must not be Conceived to be the goods of all things. But human good consists of those things which alone pertain to certain persons, which accord with the advantages of the body, and which we denominate externals. And these to the wise, and to those who live conformably to right reason, are posterior to good; but are necessarily evil to the stupid, and to those who are ignorant of their proper use. The first good also is true, and is that divine, most excellent, lovely, and desirable good, the beauty of which allures all rational souls, to the love of which they are instinctively impelled, nature herself being the leader of this impulse. And because all men do not possess the power of obtaining this primary good, they tend to that good which is human. The second good is neither common to many, nor is indeed similarly good to all. For the appetite and desire of accomplishing a certain thing is incited either by true or by apparent good. Hence, to that part of the soul which accords with reason, there is naturally a certain alliance with [real] good.

Moreover, Plato thought accidental good to be that which is conjoined with the body, and with things which externally accede. He also was of opinion, that he who is naturally impelled to the pursuit of good, was not only born for himself, but likewise for all men; and this, not in an equal or similar manner, but that every one should be a friend to his country in the first place, afterwards to his parents, and, in the third place, to those who are connected with him by a necessary familiarity, or by acquaintance. That man, from his very origin, was produced neither absolutely good nor evil; but that he was naturally inclined to both; and that he has certain seeds of each of these, conjoined with his essence originally, and which, through the discipline of education, necessarily

shoot forth into one of these. Hence the masters of children ought to be principally attentive to this, that their pupils may be lovers of virtue, or that they may be so completely imbued with morals and disciplines, that they may learn to govern and be governed by ruling Justice. On this account it is principally requisite so to instruct them, that they may know that the things which are to be pursued are excellent and beautiful, but those which are to be avoided are base and deformed; and that the former are attended with pleasure and praise, but the latter with disgrace and inherent vileness and also, that we ought confidently to desire that good which is truly excellent.

Three kinds also of natural disposition are comprehended in the doctrine of Plato; one of which he calls excellent and rare; the second he denominates most evil, and the worst; and the third is considered by him to be of a middle nature, and to be moderately mingled from both the others. And he is of opinion, that a docile child, and a man who is proceeding to a temperate life, and who is tractable and elegant in his manners, participate of this mediocrity. For he says that media of this kind intervene between the virtues and vices, as a certain third thing, from which some, actions are laudable, and others reprehensible. Between immutable science likewise and ignorance, he places two kinds of opinion, the one true, but the other false, which is characterised by a vain pervicaciousness; and between chastity and a libidinous life, he arranges abstinence and temperance. He also makes shame and cowardice to be the media between fortitude and fear. For with respect to those men whom he considered to be in a state of mediocrity, he thought they neither possessed genuine virtue, nor yet vice pure and unmingled, but mingled from what is excellent and what is base. But he says, That wickedness of the worst kind pertains to the man who is imbued with every vice; and that this takes place, when the best and rational part of the soul, which ought to govern the

other parts, is subservient to them; and anger and lust, those leaders of the vices, predominate over reason, which is then in subjection to them.

Moreover, he says, that this wickedness consists of different things, viz of excess and deficiency. And he not only thought that it was defective through the vice of inequality, but that it was also oppressed by dissimilitude. For it is not possible for that to accord with goodness, which in so many ways is discordant with itself, and not only exhibits in itself inequality, but also incongruity. Hence, he says, that the three parts of the soul are oppressed by three vices. For the rational part is opposed by indocility, which does not introduce the abolition of science, but is contrary to the discipline by which knowledge is acquired. We likewise learn from him, that of this indocility there are two species, ignorance and fatuity; of which, ignorance is found to be hostile to science, and fatuity to prudence. But the irascible part is opposed by audacity. And the attendants on this are indignation, and incommobility, which is called in Greek 'aorgesia', or a disposition incapable of being excited to anger. For I should thus denominate that which does not extinguish the incitements of anger, but fixes them in an immoveable stupor. With the desires also, he connects luxury, i.e. the appetite of pleasure, and principally of the voluptuous kind, and an insatiable longing after the possession and enjoyment of the objects of desire. From this, avarice and lasciviousness emanate; of which the one restrains liberality, but the other dissipates patrimonial possessions, by superfluous effusion.

Plato, however, says, "That virtue is a habit of the mind formed in the best and noblest manner, and which renders him in whom it faithfully resides, concordant with himself, and with other things, peaceful, and stable, not in words only, but also in deeds." But this will be more easily accomplished,

if reason, being established on the throne of its kingdom, perpetually keeps desire and anger tamed and fettered; and they become so obedient to it, that it may tranquilly discharge its proper employment. He likewise says, "That virtue is uniform, because that which is good of its own accord is not in want of support, and that which is perfect ought to be content with itself alone." Nor quality only, but similitude likewise, is conjoined with the nature of virtue. For it so accords with itself in every part, that from itself it is adapted to, and corresponds with itself. Hence, also, he calls the same virtues both media and summits; not only because they are without redundancy and deficiency, but because they are after a certain manner situated in the middle of the vices. For fortitude is surrounded by audacity on one side, and by timidity on the other; since audacity indeed is produced from an abundance of confidence; but fear is a vice arising from a deficiency of audacity.

Of the virtues also, some are perfect, but others are imperfect. And the imperfect are those which are produced in all men by the beneficence of nature only, or which are obtained by disciplines alone, and are learnt through the tuition of reason. We say, therefore, that those virtues are perfect which consist of all things [that are requisite]. But Plato denies that the imperfect virtues are concomitant with each other. He especially thought, however, that those which are perfect are inseparable, and mutually connected, because to him who has an excellent disposition, if industry accedes to this, experience also and discipline, which reason, the leader of things, has established, nothing will be wanting which virtue will not administer. He likewise distributes all the virtues conformably to the division of the parts of the soul: and that virtue which is supported by reason, and surveys and forms a judgment of all things, he calls prudence and wisdom. Of these also, he is of opinion, that wisdom is the discipline of

divine and human concerns; but that prudence is the science by which we obtain a knowledge of good and evil, and likewise of those things which are called media. But he says, "That in that part of the soul which is of a more irascible nature, the seat of fortitude, the strength of the soul, and the nerves [as it were] are contained, by which we accomplish those things, which by the command of the laws we are more severely enjoined to perform." The third part of the soul is that which pertains to appetites and desires, and of which abstinence is necessarily a companion, which, Plato says, "is the saviour of the fitness of those things which naturally possess either rectitude or depravity." In man, lust should be made to incline to complacency and mediocrity; and he says, "That voluptuous energies are restrained through abstinence and modesty." Distributing justice also, as a fourth virtue, through these three parts of the soul, he says, "That it is the cause of each of the parts performing its proper work according to the best reason and manner." That hero also, at one time denominates this virtue justice, but at another, he comprehends it by the appellation of the whole of virtue; and also calls it by the name of fidelity.

When likewise it is useful to him by whom it is possessed, it is benevolence; but when it looks to things external to itself, and is a faithful observer of the utility of others, it is denominated [simply] justice. That also is justice, which possesses the fourth place in the common division of the virtues, and is conjoined with religion, i.e. with piety. And of these, piety is devoted to the worship of the Gods, and to sacrifices and propitiations. But this justice is the remedy and medicine of the society and concord of men. Justice, however, rules over what is advantageous to mankind, from two equal causes, of which the first consists in the observance of numbers, the equality of divisions, and the instruments of compacts: and in addition to these, it is the guardian of weights and measures,

and the communication of public wealth. The second kind of justice is final, and is a division proceeding from equity, in order that a congruous dominion over land may be imparted to each individual, and that a greater portion of it may be preserved for the good, but a less for the evil. Through this justice, likewise, every one who is good both from nature and his own industry, is promoted to honours and offices; but the worst of citizens are deprived of the splendour of dignity. For he just mode which ought to be observed by him who is a favourer of the good, and a subjugator of the evil, in bestowing and preserving honour, consists in this, that those things should always be transcendent in the city, which will be beneficial to all the citizens, but that vices, together with the authors of them, should be in an abject and degraded condition. This, however, will be more easily accomplished, if we are instructed by the examples of two kinds of men; the one being divine, tranquil, and blessed; but the other irreligious, inhuman, and who are deservedly never adduced as witnesses; in order that, being alienated from the worst of characters, and who is averse to upright conduct, we may be desirous of committing our possessions to the management of that divine, celestial, and worthy man.

Hence, according to Plato, there are two parts of rhetoric; one of which is a discipline contemplative of good, and tenacious of what is just, and is adapted to and concordant with the profession of him who wishes to be considered as a political character; but the other is the science of adulation, explores probabilities, and is obtained by experience without the assistance of reason. For thus we explain 'alogon trilen', which wishes to persuade what it is unable to teach. Plato defines this part of rhetoric to be the power of persuading without teaching, and calls it the shadow, i.e. the image of a certain part of the political science. But he is of opinion, that we ought to consider this science as one among the number of

the virtues; and to survey it not only as active and conversant with the administration of things, but as directing its attention to all things, and rightly distinguishing them. He also thought that providence, [or antecedent policy] not only benefited political concerns, but that the whole of its intention and purpose consisted in rendering the condition of the city fortunate and blessed. This also procures what is useful to the soul in two ways; one of which is legal, but the other juridical. But the former of these is similar to the exercise, by which the beauty and strength of the soul are acquired; just as by [gymnastic] exercise the health and gracefulness of the body are preserved. The juridical is similar to medicine. For the former heals the diseases of the soul, in the same manner as the latter those of the body. Plato calls these disciplines, and asserts that an attention to them is attended with great utility. He also says, "That the culinary and cosmetic arts are the imitators of these; but that the sophistical art, and the bland profession of law, employing the base allurements of flattery, are useless to all men," Of these also, he conjoins the sophistical with the culinary art. For as the latter sometimes arrogates to itself the profession of medicine, in the opinion of the ignorant, as if those things which it effects accorded with the cure of diseases; so the sophistical art, imitating the juridical profession, causes the stupid to think that it is studious of justice, when at the same time it is certain that it is favourable to iniquity. But the professors of law imitate the cosmetic art. For as the latter wishes to be considered in the place of a remedy, through which the beauty and health of bodies are preserved, though it not only diminishes the utility of bodies, but also destroys their strength and powers, and changes their true colour, through the inactivity of the blood which it occasions; so likewise the former, imitating the science of law, pretends indeed that it increases virtue in the soul, but in reality debilitates its native industry.

Plato likewise thought that those virtues may be taught and obtained by study, which pertain to the rational soul, i.e. wisdom and prudence; and also that those virtues which resist the vicious parts of the soul, and are, as it were, their remedy, viz fortitude and temperance, participate of reason; but that the former virtues are to be considered as disciplines. The rest, if they are perfect, he calls virtues; but if they are half perfect, he does not think indeed that they should be called disciplines, nor does he conceive that they are totally foreign from disciplines. He is of opinion, however, that justice, which is scattered through the three regions of the soul, is the art and discipline of living; and that at one time it may be obtained by teaching, but at another by use and experience.

With respect also to such things as are good, he asserts that some are desirable for their own sake, such as beatitude and harmless joy; others are not desirable for their own sake, as medicine; and others are desirable both for their own sake, and for the sake of something else, as prudence and the other virtues, which we desire both on their own account, as being essentially excellent and good, and for the sake of something else, t e. beatitude, which is the most desirable fruit of the virtues. After this manner, likewise, some evils are to be avoided for their own sake, others for the sake of other things, and many, both on their own account and on account of other things; such as folly, and vices of the like kind, which are to be avoided both for their own sake, and for the sake of the consequences with which they may be attended, viz misery and infelicity. Again, of those things which are desirable, some we denominate absolutely good, which when they are possessed, bring with them utility, always and to all men; as the virtues, the fruit of which is blessedness. Others are good to some, but not to all, nor always; as strength, riches, and whatever pertains to the body and fortune. In like manner also, of those things which are to be avoided, some

appear to be evil to all men and always, because they are noxious and impede; as the vices and misfortunes; but others are only evil to certain persons, and are not always noxious to them; as disease, poverty, and the rest of this kind. Virtue, however, is free, is in our own power, and is that which we wish to obtain. Vices also are not less free and in our power, yet the attainment of them is not the object of our choice. For he who directs his attention to virtue, when he understands that it is entirely good, and excels in benignity, will think that it is to be desired and pursued for its own sake. Just as he who perceives that vices are not only attended with infamy, but are also noxious on another account, and deceptive, cannot voluntarily associate with them, But if he tends to evils of this kind, and believes that the use of them will be beneficial to him; then he is deceived by error, and is allured indeed by the image of good, but is ignorantly precipitated to evil. For you would be discordant with common opinion, if not being ignorant of the difference between poverty and riches, and that either may be most easily obtained by you, and also, if knowing that poverty will not procure dignity, nor riches disgrace, you should prefer the want of things necessary to the support of life, to an abundance of them; since, in this case, you would be considered as insane. And it would be still more absurd, if some one, despising the health of the body, should give the preference to disease. But it would be the extremity of insanity, for one who has seen with the eyes of the soul the beauty of virtue, and who knows its utility both from experience and reason, and is not ignorant how much disgrace and inconvenience result from a participation of the vices, to wish nevertheless to be enslaved to vice.

Plato also says, that health of body, strength, a privation of pain, and other external goods of this kind, and likewise riches and other things which we call the benefits of fortune, are not to be denominated simply good. For if any one who

possesses them should deprive himself of their use, they would be superfluous to him; but they will be found to be noxious to him, who converts the use of them to depraved arts. He likewise who uses them badly, will be obnoxious to vice; and the possessor of them cannot retain them when he dies. Hence, it may be inferred, that these ought not to be called simply good; nor are those things which are of an afflictive nature, such as poverty, and the like, to be considered as evils. For if he whose means of living are small, is moderate in his expense, he will perceive no inconvenience from the slenderness of his income, but will be more able, and better adapted to the endurance of other things. If, therefore, there is nothing repugnant in suffering poverty, and yet governing it by reason, poverty is not of itself evil. Plato likewise thought, that pleasure is neither absolutely good, nor simply evil; but that the pleasure which is worthy, and which does not accede from things of a shameful nature, but from glorious deeds, is not to be avoided; while, on the contrary, it is requisite to shun that pleasure, which nature herself despises, and which is procured by base delight. He also was of opinion that solicitude and labour, if they are natural, and originate from virtue itself, and are undertaken for the accomplishment of something illustrious, are desirable; but that if they are produced contrary to nature, for the sake of what is most base, they are evil and detestable. And farther still, that not only vices accede voluntarily to the mind and body, but that there is likewise a certain middle state, such as is that when sorrow is absent, and yet we do not find that joy is present.

Of those things likewise which are in our power, the first and laudable good, to him who desires [real] good; is virtue, and which, therefore, it is requisite to call honesty; for we conceive that alone to be good which is honest, just as we think that which is dishonest is evil. And it very properly

follows, that what is base cannot be good. Plato also says, that friendship is the conciliator of society, that it consists in concord, and that it is reciprocal, and produces mutual delight, when the love on both sides is equal. Friendship is attended with this advantage [of mutual delight], when a friend wishes that he who is the object of his love may be blessed with prosperity, in the same manner as he himself wishes to be blest: But this equality cannot be effected, unless there is an according similitude in both, through an equal fondness. For as equals are conjoined with equals by an indissoluble bond, so unequals are mutually disjoined, and are not friendly to each other. The vices, however, of enmities are produced by malevolence, through a dissimilitude of manners, a discordancy of life, and professions and dispositions contrary to each other. For Plato says, that there are other kinds of friendship; of which, some are generated for the sake of pleasure, but others from necessity. And the love, indeed, of familiars and children is consentaneous to nature; but that which is for the sake of pleasure only, and which is vulgarly called love, is abhorrent from the clemency of humanity, and is an ardent appetite, by the libidinous stimulus of which, the lovers of body being captivated, think that the whole man consists in that which they behold. The same Plato forbids us to call such like calamities of souls friendships, because they are not mutual, and are incapable of producing reciprocal love, and neither possess constancy nor length of duration. To which may be added, that such love terminates in satiety and penitence.

Hence Plato enumerates three kinds of love; of which one is divine, being in concord with an incorruptible intellect and the nature of virtue, and which is not accompanied by repentance; the second pertains to a degenerate mind, and the most corrupt pleasure; and the third is mingled from both, and pertains to a soul of a temperate disposition and

moderate desires. But souls that are more clouded with oblivion are impelled by corporeal desires, and propose to themselves one thing only, that they may enjoy the use of bodies, and may assuage their ardour by pleasure and delight of this kind. Purer minds, who are facetious and courteous, love the souls of those that are good, are benevolent to them, and desirous that they may excel in laudable arts, and may be rendered more worthy and illustrious characters. Souls of a middle nature consist of both the extremes, and in consequence of this are not entirely averse to the delights of the body, and may be allured by souls of an amiable disposition. As, therefore, that most filthy, brutal, and base love is not engendered from the nature of things, but from disease and corporeal infirmity, so that divine love, which was bestowed by the beneficence of the Gods, is believed to accede to the minds of men through the inspiration of the celestial Cupid. There is also a third species of love, which we have denominated a medium, and which subsists through an affinity to divine and terrestrial love, is connected to each by an equal bond of alliance, and in the same manner as divine love is proximate to reason, and is joined to the desire of pleasure, like the terrestrial love.

Of vituperable men there are four species; of which the first consists of the ambitious; the second of the avaricious; the third of the vulgar; and the last of tyrannic domination. Hence that first vice happens to souls, when the vigour of reason becomes languid, and that portion of the soul in which anger predominates is the superior and more robust part. The second vice is called an oligarchy, which is produced when, on account of the most baneful nutriment of that part of the soul which consists of desires, not only the receptacles of reason and anger are occupied, but likewise those receptacles of the epithymetic part [or the part characterized by desire], which excite unnecessary desires. Plato calls the man in

whom this vice predominates a lover of gain, and an extortioner. The popular [or vulgar] quality exists when the desires, labouring under too much indulgence, are not only inflamed by just wants, but also frequently oppose them, and oppress by their evil condition the rational and irascible parts of the soul. A tyranny is a luxurious and libidinous life, consisting of infinite, different, and unlawful pleasures, and predominates over all the mind. But the worst of all men, according to Plato, is not only base and pernicious, a despiser of the Gods, and one who leads an immoderate, savage, and unsociable life, but neither accords with his kindred nor with himself, and on this account, not only dissents from others, but is at variance with his own soul, and is not only hostile to others, but likewise to himself. Hence, such a man is neither a friend to the good, nor in short to any one, nor to himself, and he is the worst of men, because he cannot be surpassed by any excess of improbity. A man of this kind can never extricate himself from difficulty in transacting business, not only on account of his ignorance, but likewise because he is unknown to himself, and because perfect improbity produces sedition in the mind, impeding its undertakings and meditated designs, and not suffering it to do any thing which it wishes to effect.

On this account, not only those vices which are preternatural, such as envy, and rejoicing in the calamities of others, render the worst of men execrable, but this is also effected by those things which nature does not reject, such as pleasure, pain, desire, love, pity, fear, shame, and anger. This, however, takes place, because an immoderate disposition, in whatever it impetuously undertakes, is without measure. Hence, the love of a man of this kind is completely corrupt; not only because he longs, through unbridled desires and an insatiable thirst, to ingurgitate pleasures of every kind, but likewise because in the judgment itself of outward form, he is led

astray by irrational error, being ignorant of true beauty, and loving the decaying, enervated, and flowing skin of the body, though [it is absurd] that he should greatly esteem members coloured by the sun, or hardened by exercise, gross through being nourished in the shade, or soft through indolence, and anointed with too much care. It is certain, indeed, that improbity rages among men in many ways, though they are unwilling that it should. For Plato says, that injustice is an inordinate passion and disease of the mind; and hence he clearly infers, that men are not spontaneously led to act unjustly. For who would voluntarily receive in himself so great a portion of evil, as knowingly to introduce baseness and wickedness into the best part of his mind? Since, therefore, the possession of evil belongs to the imprudent, it is requisite that the use of it, and the actions resulting from it, should be exercised by those that are ignorant. And hence it is worse to do an injury than to be injured. For who can be injured by these things, which are of a viler nature, viz by things corporeal and external, which may either be diminished, or may perish through fraud, those better things being uninjured which pertain to the soul itself? But it is far worse to injure. From whence it may be: understood, that this vice is the ruin of worthy souls, and that he who desires to destroy another person, injures himself in a greater degree than he injures him against whom he machinates destruction. Since likewise to injure another is the greatest of all evils, it is much worse for him who does an injury to go unpunished; and it is still more dire, and worse than all punishment, for impunity to be granted to a noxious character, and for such a one to escape the castigation of men. Just as [in the maladies of the body the worst thing that can happen to them, when they are most severe, is to be deprived of a remedy, and deceive the physician, and for those members that are diseased, neither to be cut nor burnt, though these painful operations are

necessary to the safety of the remaining parts. Hence, as the best physicians do not apply their healing hands to bodies that are in a lamentable and desperate condition, lest their unprofitable attempt to heal them should lengthen the duration of the pain, thus also it is better for those to die, whose souls are imbued with vices, and cannot be cured by the medicine of wisdom. For Plato thought, that he in whom the desire of living conformably to right reason cannot be produced, either by nature or art, ought to be expelled from life, or, if the desire of life has taken possession of him, that he ought to be delivered to wise men, by a certain art of whom he may be turned to more upright conduct. And it is indeed better for such a one to be governed, and not to possess the power of governing others, and for him not to be a master, but to be in servitude; because, being himself impotent, he is formed to be in subjection to the power of others, and is allotted the province of obeying, rather than that of commanding.

Plato further observes, that a man of the most depraved character is not only worse because he is always dilacerated by the addition of vices, but likewise because he is hurried away by the fluctuations of desires. And hence, the more he desires to obtain, the more indigent he will appear to be to himself, and on that account also to others. For scarcely will he obtain a few of those things which are the objects of his hopes and desires, and when he does, it will be attended with the greatest difficulty. The attainment also of these will be followed by more ardent furies of desires; nor will he only be tormented by future evils, but also by such as are past, and have been previously accomplished. It is manifest, therefore, that all such can only be liberated by death from evils of this kind. Those, however, that are extremely good, and those that are immoderately bad, are very few and very rare, and, as he says, may be numbered; but those who are evidently neither

the best of men, nor entirely the worst, but whose morals are as it were of a middle condition, are numerous. Neither, however, do those of a superior character among these conduct themselves properly in every thing; nor do those who are culpable among them act erroneously in all things. For the vices of these men are neither atrocious, nor unseasonable, nor excessively criminal, the nature of which consists in redundancy or deficiency; since they possess integrity, merit a moderate degree of approbation, and proceed in a middle path, which is situated between praise and blame. They are also excited to certain undertakings by a desire of such a kind, as at one time to be allured by good and worthy men, conformably to reason, and at another to be insnared by dishonest gain and base pleasures. Such men neither persevere in the fidelity of friendship, nor does that love which is not always unworthy, nor yet always worthy, invade their mind.

Plato likewise says, that no one can be completely wise, unless he excels others in his natural disposition, is perfect in disciplines and the parts of prudence, and has been imbued with them from his childhood, being: accustomed to appropriate words and deeds, and also purified and defecated by the pleasures of the mind, deriving from the parts of prudence, temperance, and endurance, and from disciplines, doctrines produced by eloquence and a scientific knowledge of things. He adds, that he who, beginning from these, proceeds in the path of virtue with a confident and secure step, having thus obtained a solid method of living, will suddenly become perfect, i.e. will suddenly arrive at the extreme parts of the past and future time, and become, after a certain manner, eternal. Then after this, the vices being expelled, and every thing inserted and introduced which leads to a blessed life, the wise man will rightly think that felicity does not depend on others, and cannot by others be imparted

to him, but is in his own power. Hence he will neither be elevated in prosperous circumstances, nor depressed in such as are adverse; since he will know that he is so furnished with his own ornaments, that he cannot be separated from them by any force, however great. It is likewise requisite that such a man should not only refrain from doing an injury, but also from returning it. For as he does not think that to be an injury which is done by an unworthy man; so likewise neither does he think that to be so which patience can firmly endure. Hence, by this law of nature, it is engraved in his mind, that none of those things can hurt a wise man, which are thought by others to be evils. Indeed, this wise man, trusting to his own conscience, will be secure and confident through the whole of life, because he considers all accidental circumstances as ultimately contributing to what is best, and also because he receives nothing morosely, or with difficulty, and is firmly persuaded that his concerns are under the [providential] inspection of the immortal Gods.

The same wise man, also, expects the day of his death with good omens, and not unwillingly, because he confides in the immortality of his soul. For the soul of the wise man, being liberated from its corporeal bonds, will return to the Gods; and, according to the desert of a life passed with purity and sanctity, will through this procure for itself a condition similar to that of the Gods. He likewise denominates the same wise man most excellent, and rightly conceives him to be both good and prudent, since his counsels accord with the most upright deeds, and the principles of his conduct are derived from justice itself. He likewise adds, that this wise man possesses the greatest mental strength, because, through the vigour of his mind, he is prepared for the endurance of all things. Hence it is that Plato calls fortitude the nerves and the very neck of the soul, just as he says that cowardice is most proximate to the imbecility of the soul. Rightly also does he

think that this wise man is the only rich man, because he alone appears to possess the riches of the virtues which are more precious than all treasures. The wise man, likewise, ought to be considered as most rich, because he alone can rightly employ wealth to necessary purposes. For others, though they abound in riches, yet appear to be needy, because they are either ignorant of their use, or pervert them to the worst of ends. For it is not the absence of money that produces penury, but the presence of immoderate desires. — It is requisite, therefore, that the philosopher, — if he is in want of nothing, is firm and unshaken in every fortune, and is superior to those things which are considered by most men as very difficult to be borne, — should not be so attentive to any thing, as to the perpetual endeavour of separating his soul from its conjunction with the body; and on this account it is proper to think that philosophy is the desire of death, and the being accustomed to die. All good men likewise ought to be friends to, though they are not known to, each other, and they are to be considered as friends, through that very power by which their manners and pursuits mutually accord: for similars are not abhorrent from similars. Whence it is certain, that the fidelity of friendship can only subsist among the good. Wisdom causes a youth to be a lover of a good man, when the youth is one who is more prompt to the attainment of good arts, through the probity of his natural disposition. Nor can deformity of body expel a love of this kind. For when the soul herself is the object of delight, the whole man is beloved; but when the body is the object of desire, the worst part of the man is dear to him who possesses this desire. Deservedly, therefore, is it to be thought, that he who knows what is [really] good is also desirous of things that are of the same kind with it. For he alone is inflamed with good desires who sees that [true] good with the eyes of the soul, and he is the wise man. This, however, takes place, because it is

necessary that he who is ignorant should also be a hater of, and an enemy to, the virtues. Nor is it vainly asserted, that such a man is also a lover of base pleasures.

The wise man likewise does not apply himself to the performance of any thing merely for the sake of pleasure alone, unless it is accompanied by the honest emoluments of virtue. And it is necessary that, in conjunction with a pleasure of this kind, he should lead a worthy and admirable life, and a life full of honour and glory. Nor is he to be preferred to all other men for the sake of these things only; but he also is the only man who always enjoys jucundity and security. Nor will he be disquieted when deprived of the most dear objects of his affection, either because every thing which tends to beatitude is adapted to him, or because grief of this kind is interdicted by the decree and law of right reason; and likewise because he who torments himself through such a cause, either suffers that affliction on account of him who is dead, as if he was in a worse condition than when living, or for his own sake, because he grieves that he is deprived of such, an alliance. Lamentations, however, ought not to be indulged, on account of the death of any one, if we know that the deceased will not suffer any evil, and that, if he was a worthy man, he will associate with more excellent beings; nor will the wise man grieve on his own account, because he deposits all things in himself, and cannot, by the loss of any man, be indigent of virtue, of which he vindicates to himself the perpetual possession. And hence, the wise man will not be sorrowful [whatever may befall him].

The end of wisdom also is this, that the wise man may arrive at the excellence of divinity [as far as this is possible to man]; and this must be his endeavour, to accede to the energies of the Gods, by emulating their life. But this he may accomplish, if he causes himself to become a man perfectly just, pious,

and prudent. On which account it is requisite that he should, endeavour to attain those things which are approved both by Gods and men, not only in the knowledge of foreseeing [what is proper to be done], but also in the actual performance of what is right. For the supreme God not only surveys by a dianoëtic energy all these particulars, but likewise pervades through the first, middle, and last of things, and, possessing a profound knowledge of them, governs them by the universality and immutability of his providential administration. And Plato indeed says, that to all men that nature appears to be blessed which possesses good, and knows after what manner it ought to be free from vice.

But with respect to beatitude; one kind is produced when we defend what we effect, by paying a proper attention to it; but another kind is the consequence of nothing being wanting to the perfection of life, and when we are satisfied with the contemplative energy. The origin, however, of both these kinds of felicity emanates from virtue; and to the ornament, indeed, of the genial place, or of virtue, we have no need of those external aids which we imagine to be good. But to the purposes of the common life, the care of the body, and those auxiliaries which accede to us externally, are requisite; nevertheless, in such a manner as that these very same things may be rendered better through virtue, and may, by its assistance, be conjoined with the benefits of beatitude, without which they are by no means to be ranked in the number of things that are [truly] good. Nor is it without reason, that virtue alone can make men most fortunate; since without this, felicity cannot be obtained from other things of a prosperous nature. For we call the wise man an attendant on and an imitator of God, and we think that he follows God: for this is the meaning of 'epou lew'. It is, however, not only requisite, that he should speak what is worthy to be asserted of the Gods, while he lives, and that he should do nothing

which is displeasing to their majesty, but also at the very time when he is leaving the body, from which he will not emigrate contrary to the will of divinity. For though he has in his own hand the power of dying, yet he ought not to be the cause of his own death, unless the divine law shall have decreed that this is necessary to be suffered: though he knows that when he leaves terrestrial natures, he shall obtain a better condition of being. And if his character is adorned by the illustrious deeds of his past life, yet it is requisite that he should pay attention to honest fame while he lives, since being confident of his future existence, he permits his soul to proceed to immortality, and presumes because he has lived piously, that it will be an inhabitant of the fortunate islands, and be mingled with the choirs of Gods and Demigods.

With respect to the constitution of cities, and the particulars which are to be observed in the administration of polities, Plato orders as follows: In the first place, he thus defines the form of a city. A city is a mutual conjunction of many men, among which some govern, but others obey, and who are united to each other by concord, afford each other defence and assistance, and in the performance of their respective duties, use the same laws, but nevertheless such as are just. This city also will be one, if it is surrounded with the same walls, and the minds of the inhabitants are accustomed to approve and reject the same things. Hence, it is requisite to persuade the founders of polities, that they should give such an extent to the place which the people are to inhabit, that all of them may be known by the same governor, and that they may not be unknown to each other. For thus it will happen, that all of them will be of one mind, and will wish for themselves what is equitable. Indeed, it is not fit that a great city should rely on the multitude of its inhabitants, or on its great power. For it should not think that the power of body and of riches are to be esteemed when they are associated

with indolence and pride, but when the inhabitants being men that are adorned with all the virtues, and being all of them firmly fixed in the laws, are obedient to the common decree. Other cities, however, which are not constituted after this manner, are not sane cities, but are foul polities, and tumid with disease. In the last place, Plato says, that those polities are founded in reason, which are constituted conformably to the arrangement of the [parts of the] soul; so that the most excellent part which transcends in wisdom and prudence, may govern the multitude; and that as the soul providentially attends to the whole body, thus also the decisions of prudence may defend and preserve whatever is advantageous to the whole city.

Fortitude, likewise, which is the second part of virtue, as it corrects and represses by its power desire [in, the soul], thus also, it ought to be equally vigilant in a city. Hence, in the place of sentinels, the youth should fight for the benefit of the whole community. But the discipline of those who are capable of giving better counsel, should bridle, restrain, and if it is necessary destroy those who are restless, untamed, and are therefore the worst of citizens. But Plato is of opinion that the third part of the soul, which is the seat of desires, is similar to the common people, and to husbandmen; and he thinks that this part is to be sustained by moderate advantages. He denies however the possibility of the continuance of a polity, unless he who presides over it is studious of wisdom; or he who is elected to be the ruler, is the wisest of men. For he says, that all the citizens should be imbued with manners of this kind, so that those to whose custody and fidelity the polity is committed, may have no wish to possess silver and gold; and also that they may not desire the wealth of private individuals, under the pretext of employing it for the general good; nor live in such a manner as to procure sustenance for themselves, without opening their doors to others, and

consume in mutual banquets the gifts which they have received from those whom they protect.

He likewise says that marriages should not be private, but should be made to be common, the wise men, and the magistrates of the city, and those who by lot are adapted to this employment, publicly affiancing such nuptials; and being especially careful to prevent those that are unequal or dissimilar from being united to each other. With these things, also, a necessary and useful mixture is connected, so that from the mingled education of children as yet unknown, the knowledge of who were their parents may be rendered difficult; and thus, while parents are ignorant of their own children, they may believe that all whom they see of the same age, are their own, and that all may be the parents of all as of common children. Besides this, likewise, a seasonable conjunction of these marriages must be investigated, the fidelity of which Plato thinks will be stable, if the number of the days accords with the harmony of music. And those who will be born from such like nuptials should be imbued with appropriate studies, and instructed in the best disciplines by the preceptors with whom authority for this purpose is to be invested in common; and not only the male, but also the female sex, are to be tutored after this manner. For Plato is of opinion, that women should be instructed in all the arts, and even those of war, which are thought to pertain peculiarly to men; since there is the same virtue of each, because each has one and the same nature. He also says, that such a city has no need of laws externally introduced; for as it is established by royal prudence, and such institutes and manners as we have mentioned, it does not require other laws. And this polity was composed by him as a certain resemblance of truth, for the sake of an example.

There is also another polity [described by Plato], which is sufficiently just, and fabricated as a paradigm, not indeed, as the former, without evidence, but with something of existing truth. In this polity he does not regulate the state and advantages of the city conformably to his own will, investigating for this purpose the principles and foundations of its origin; but his intention is to show how the political ruler, having obtained a place of this kind, and a multitude of people, ought to cause the city to become full of good laws and excellent morals, according to the nature of existing circumstances, and the disposition of its inhabitants. In this city, likewise, he ordains that there shall be the same education of youth, and the same disciplines of arts [as in the former city]. But in marriages and births, and patrimonies and houses, he departs from the regulations which he adopted in the former polity; for he makes the marriages to be private and peculiar, and to be the nuptials of the suitors of virgins. And though those who are about to form the nuptial league ought to consult their own will, yet he orders that the affair shall be considered by the rulers of the whole city as a thing which pertains to the general good. Hence, the rich must not refuse to, marry women that are not wealthy, and the poor must enter into an alliance with the rich; though there is an inequality in the property of the two. Different dispositions also are to be mingled together; so that a mild woman may be united to an irascible man, and an irascible woman to a tranquil man; in order that the offspring produced from different dispositions, may, by the assistance of and advantage arising from such ordinances, be formed to better manners, and thus the city may be increased by the wealth of families constituted after this manner.

The offspring themselves, likewise, which are generated from the seed of parents of dissimilar dispositions, since they possess a resemblance to both, will neither want vigour in the

execution of what they undertake to perform, nor sagacity in perceiving what is requisite to be done. They are to be educated, however, in such a way as may be deemed proper by their parents. Their houses also, and private possessions, must be adapted to their condition, which Plato does not suffer either to increase immensely through avarice, or to be dissipated through luxury, or abandoned through negligence. He likewise orders laws to be promulgated for this city, and exhorts the moderator of the laws, [i.e. the legislator], to the contemplation of the virtues, when he intends to establish any thing of this kind. But he thinks that mode of government to be useful, which is mingled from the three modes. For he does not think that the domination of the nobles, or of the people merely and alone, is good. Nor does he leave the faults of the rulers unpunished; but yet he is of opinion, that it is better for those to govern, who are superior in power. He also conceives, that other forms of polities may be defined, which tend to worthy manners. And with respect to that polity which he says subsists by emendation, he orders that the ruler of it should in the first place complete the laws which remain to be enacted, or correct such as are vicious; and that in the next place he should convert the pernicious manners and corrupt disciplines of the city to a better condition; from which corruption, if the depraved multitude cannot be changed by counsel and persuasion, they must be led away from their enterprise unwillingly and by force.

In the city, however, which is already constituted, he describes the manner in which the whole multitude of men contained in it may be governed with probity and justice. But these being such, will love their kindred, honour the magistrates, expel intemperance, and restrain injustice; bestowing the greatest honours on prudence, and the other ornaments of life. Nor should the multitude rashly fly to a polity thus governed, unless they have been educated

conformably to the best laws and the most excellent precepts, so as to be moderate towards others, and concordant among themselves. Lastly, he says that there are four genera of culpable citizens; the first, of those who transcend in dignity; the second, of the few who possess the supreme power; the third comprehends all the citizens; and the fourth and last pertains to tyrannic domination. And the first indeed is confounded, when more prudent men are expelled from the city by seditious magistrates, and the supreme power is delivered to those who are only strenuous in the hand; and when those who are capable of managing the affairs of the city by milder counsel, have no share in the administration, but only those who are turbulent and violent. But the polity is in the hands of a few, when many that are needy and criminal, being at one and the same time in subjection to the violence of a few rich men, deliver and commit themselves to them; and not worthy manners, but opulence, obtains all the ruling power. And the popular faction is corroborated, when the needy multitude predominates over the rich, and the law is promulgated by the command of the people, so that honours may be equally obtained by all the citizens. To which may be added, that the only principle of tyrannic domination is then produced, when he who has violated the laws by his own contumacy, invades the domination to which he was elected by a conspiracy against the laws; and afterwards having decreed that all the multitude of citizens shall be obedient to his desires and his avarice, directs also to this end the obedience which he requires.

BOOK THE THIRD. ON INTERPRETATION, OR CONCERNING THE CATEGORIC SYLLOGISM.

THE LOVE OF wisdom, which we call philosophy, is generally thought to have three parts, viz physics, ethics, and that of which I have now proposed to speak, logic, in which the art of disputation and reasoning is contained. But since [in treating of logic], we speak of a sentence of which there are various species, such as those of commanding, or narrating, of ordering, expostulating, wishing, vowing, of expressing anger, hatred, envy, kindness, commiseration, admiration, contempt, reproof, repentance, lamentation, and besides these, of introducing pleasure, and exciting fear; in all which, it is the province of an excellent orator to enunciate things of an ample nature with brevity, such as are of a confined nature diffusedly, such as are vulgar gracefully, those that are novel in a usual manner, and those that are usual accompanied with novelty; to extenuate what is great, to be able to effect the greatest things from such as are the smallest, and to accomplish many other things of the like kind; — since this is the case, there is one sentence among these which especially pertains to what is now proposed to be discussed, and which is called enunciative, comprehending a definite meaning, and being the only one among all sentences which is capable of truth or falsehood. This is called by Sergius *effatum*, by Varro *proloquium*, by Cicero *enuntiatum*, and by the Greeks *protasis* or a proposition, and also *axioma*, or an axiom. But I denominate it word for word, *protentio* and *rogamentum*.

Of propositions, therefore, as also of conclusions themselves, there are two species, the one enunciative, which likewise is simple, as if we should say, he who reigns is blessed; the other substitutive or conditional, which also is compounded, as if you should say he who reigns is blessed, if he is wise. For you substitute the condition, through which he is not blessed unless he is wise. Now, however, we shall speak of the enunciative, which is prior by nature, and as it were the element of the conditional proposition. There are, likewise,

other differences of propositions, viz differences of quantity and quality. Of quantity, indeed, because some are universal; as, every thing that breathes lives; but others are particular; as, some animals do not breathe; and others are indefinite; as, an animal breathes. For it does not define whether every animal, or only some one breathes, yet it always has the power of a particular proposition; because it is more safe to assume that from an uncertain thing, which is less [comprehensive than what is universal]. But there are differences of the quality of propositions: some of them being affirmative, because they affirm something of a certain thing; as, virtue is good: for it affirms that goodness is in virtue: — others are negative, which deny something of a certain thing; as, pleasure is not good: for it denies that goodness is inherent in pleasure. The Stoics however think, that this proposition also is affirmative, when they say, it happens to a certain pleasure that it is not good. For he who says this affirms that which happens to it, i.e. affirms what it is. Hence, they say it is affirmative, because it affirms that which does not appear to be, of that thing in which it denies it to be inherent. But they alone call that proposition negative, to which a negative particle is prefixed. These, however, are vanquished as well in other things as in this, if any one makes the following proposition; that which has no substance, is not. For according to what they say, they are compelled to confess, that a thing exists which is not, because it has no substance.

Moreover, a proposition, as Plato says in the *Theætetus*, consists of two, and those the smallest, parts of speech, a noun and verb; as, Apuleius discourses, which is either true or false, and is therefore a proposition. Hence some have thought that these two are the only parts of speech, because a perfect sentence may be made from these alone; and this is because they abundantly comprehend what is intended to be

signified. But adverb, pronoun, participle, and conjunction, and other things of this kind which grammarians enumerate, are not more parts of speech, than flags are parts of a ship, or hairs of men; or certainly, in the whole conjunction of speech, these are to be considered in the place of nails, and pitch, and glue. Farther still, of the two before-mentioned parts, the one is denominated subjective, as being subject or situated under; as, Apuleius; but the other is declarative [or enunciative]; as, he discourses, or does not discourse; for it declares what Apuleius does. It is lawful also to extend each of these parts into many words, the same power [as to meaning] remaining; as if, instead of Apuleius, he should say, a Platonic philosopher of Madaura; and also, if, instead of discoursing, you should say, he employs speech. Most frequently, however, the subjunctive part is less, but the declarative [or predicative] greater; and the latter comprehends not only the former, but also other subjective parts. For not only Apuleius discourses, but likewise many other men, who may be contained under the same enunciation. Unless perhaps the peculiarity of any thing should be predicated of it; as if you should say, a horse is something capable of neighing. But to neigh is the peculiarity of a horse. Hence, in these peculiarities, the predicate and subject are equally extended, and the predicate is not more widely extended, as in other propositions; since here the same thing may, vice versa, become the subject, and have for its predicate that which it had before for a subject. As if, changing the order, you should say, that which is capable of neighing is a horse. But, where the parts are unequal, you cannot convert after the same manner. For it does not follow that because it is true, every man is an animal, that, on this account, if you convert, it will be true to say, every animal is a man. For to be an animal is not the peculiarity of man, in the same manner as to neigh is the peculiarity of a horse, since there are other innumerable

animals besides man. Hence the predicate is known by many indications, though the proposition should be exhibited in a converse order; in the first place, because [that which is declarative or] the predicate may comprehend a much greater number of things than the subject; and, in the next place, because it is never terminated by a noun, but always by a verb, by which especially it is distinguished from an equal subjective part in those peculiarities.

It must also be observed, as an example, that as propositions are definite and indefinite, so likewise it is certain that both the subjunctive and declarative particles are partly definite, as, man, animal; and partly indefinite, as, not a man, not an animal. For they do not define what the thing is, since it is not this thing; but they only show that it is some other thing than this. Now, therefore, it must be explained how these four propositions are affected towards each other, which it will not be foreign to the purpose to survey in a square form. There are, therefore, in the superior line, as may be seen in what follows, the universal affirmative, and the universal negative; as, all pleasure is good, no pleasure is good. And these are said to be incongruous [or contrary] to each other. Likewise, in the inferior line, under both these, these particulars are denoted; some pleasure is good, some pleasure is not good. And these are said to be nearly equal to each others. Afterwards, two oblique angular lines are drawn; of which one extends from universal affirmative to particular negative; but the other from particular affirmative to universal negative; which propositions, being contrary to each other both in quantity and quality, are called *alterutra* i.e. one or the other, because it is now necessary that one of them should be true. And this opposition is said to be perfect and entire. Between the propositions, however, which are nearly equal [or the subcontraries], and those that are incongruous [or contraries], there is a divisible opposition, because the

incongruous are never, indeed, at one and the same time true, yet are sometimes at once false; but those that are nearly equal are, vice versa, never at one and the same time false, yet sometimes are at once true; and on this account the refutation of either of them confirms the truth of the other, though the confirmation of the truth of either does not confute the other. He, indeed, who proves that either of two contraries is true, subverts the other; yet it does not follow, vice versa, that he who subverts either, establishes on that account the other. But of those propositions that are called alterutrœ, he who proves the truth of the one refutes the other; and he who refutes the one establishes the truth of the other.

Moreover, every universal proposition, when proved to be true, confirms its own particular proposition; but, if refuted, does not on that account refute it. On the contrary, a particular proposition, if refuted confutes also its own universal proposition; but, when proved to be true, does not establish it. An inspection of what is written below will easily show that all we have said is true, from the propositions themselves.

For here it is evident what that is which is conceded by him who proposes any thing. But each universal is subverted in a threefold manner, when either its own particular proposition is shown to be false, or either of two other propositions is demonstrated to be true, whether it be a contrary or contradictory. It is confirmed, however, by one mode, if the proposition which contradicts it is shown to be false. On the contrary, a particular proposition is subverted indeed by one mode, if its contradictory is demonstrated to be true. But it is confirmed in a threefold manner, if its universal proposition is true, or either of the two others is false, whether it be the subcontrary of it, or its contradictory. We may observe the

same things also in equipollent propositions. But those propositions sure called equipollent which have the same power, though with a different enunciation, and which are at the same time true, or at the same time false; viz one on account of the other, as the indefinite and particular. Every proposition likewise, if it assumes in the beginning a negative particle, becomes its equipollent contradictory. Thus, since this proposition, all pleasure is good, is an universal affirmative, if negation is placed before it, it will become, not every pleasure is good, having the same power of signification as its contradictory, a certain pleasure is not good. This also must be understood to take place in the other three propositions.

But it is now requisite to speak of conversion. A universal negative, therefore, and its contradictory, i.e. a particular affirmative proposition, are called convertible propositions, because the particles of them, i.e. the subject and the predicate, may always change places with each other, the condition of truth or falsehood still remaining. For, as this proposition is true, no prudent man is impious, thus also, if you change the places of the terms, it will be true, that no impious man is prudent. In like manner, as it is false that no man is an animal; so, if you convert, it will be false that no animal is a man. Thus, too, a particular affirmative proposition is converted, a certain grammarian is a man, and a certain man is a grammarian, which the two other propositions cannot always effect. For though they may sometimes be converted, yet they are not on that account called convertible, since that which sometimes deceives is not assumed as a thing which is certain. Each proposition, therefore, must be investigated through all its significations, in order to discover whether the propositions accord with each other, even when they are converted. Nor, in reality, are they innumerable, but five only. For either the peculiarity is

predicated of a certain thing, or genus, or difference, or definition [a e. Species], or accident; nor, besides these, can any other be found in any proposition. Thus, if you place man as a subject, whatever you may predicate of him, you will either signify his peculiarity, as that he is risible; or his genus, as that he is an animal; or his difference, as that he is rational; or his definition, as that he is a rational mortal animal; or that which is accidental to him, as that he is an orator. For every thing declarative [or which is the predicate of a certain thing], either may, vice versa, become the subject of that thing, or may not. But if it may, it either signifies what it is, and is the definition of it, or it does not signify this, and is the peculiarity of it. And if it cannot become the subject of it, either it is that which ought to be placed in the definition, and is genus, or difference; or it is that which ought not to be placed, and is accident. Through these things, therefore, it may be known, that a particular negative is not convertible.

A universal affirmative, likewise, is not convertible, yet it may be particularly converted. Thus, when the proposition is, every man is an animal, it cannot be so converted, as that it will be true that every animal is a man; but it may be particularly converted, a certain animal is a man. This will take place, however, in the simple conversion, which, in the inferences of conclusions, is called reflection. For there is also another conversion of propositions, which not only produces a contrary order of the terms, but also brings the terms themselves to the contrary of What they were before; so that the term which was definite becomes indefinite; and, on the contrary, that which was indefinite becomes definite. The remaining two propositions admit this conversion alternately, viz the universal affirmative, and the particular negative; as, every man is an animal; every thing which is not an animal is not man. In like manner, a certain animal is not rational; a certain thing which is not rational is an animal. You will find,

through those five before-mentioned species, that this perpetually takes place, conformably to what we have asserted. But the connexion of propositions, through another common particle [i.e. through the middle term], by means of which they are copulated to each other, is-called their conjugation; for thus they are able to accord in one conclusion. And this common particle is necessarily either the subject in each proposition, or the predicate in each; or it is the subject in one, and the predicate in the other. Three formulæ, therefore, [or figures] are produced; of which one is called the first, when that common particle is a subject in one term, and a predicate in the other. And this order is not dependent merely on enumeration, but is distinguished by the dignity of the conclusions. For the third formula [or figure] is the last, because nothing is concluded in it except that which is particular. The second figure is superior to this, which has universal conclusions, yet they are only such as are negative. Hence the first figure so excels the rest, because it concludes in every kind, of inferences. But I call the inference, or conclusive proposition, that which is collected and inferred from the premises, or the things admitted. Moreover, the premise is a proposition, which is granted by him who answers. Thus, if any one should ask, Is not every thing honest good? it is a proposition. And, if he should say that he assents, the interrogation being taken away, it is a premise, or thing admitted; which, nevertheless, is commonly called a proposition; as, every thing honest is good. To this add another premise, similarly proposed and granted, viz every thing good is useful.

From this conjugation, as we shall presently show, the conclusion of the first figure is formed; which if direct is universal, as, every thing honest therefore is useful; but if indirect, particular, as, something useful therefore is honest; because a universal affirmative proposition can only be

converted particularly in indirect conclusions. But I say the conclusion will be direct, when the same particle [or term] is the subject as well in the conjugation as in the conclusion and likewise, when the same term is predicated in both. And the conclusion will be indirect, when this takes place vice versa. Moreover the whole of that reasoning which consists of propositions that are granted and inference, is denominated a collection [i.e. a syllogism, 'sullogismos', or conclusion, and may be thus most aptly defined, according to Aristotle: "A discourse, in which certain things being admitted, something else different from the things admitted necessarily happens, in consequence of the existence of these [admitted propositions]". In which definition, no other species of discourse is to be understood than that which is enunciative; which, as we have before observed, is alone either true or false. Hence, it is said in the plural number, certain things being admitted, because a syllogism is not produced from one proposition only being granted; though to Antipater the Stoic, contrary to the opinion of all men, this conclusion [from one proposition] appeared to be complete; viz. You see, therefore you live; which, however, is only complete after this manner; If you see you live; but you do see, and therefore you live. Further still, because we wish to conclude, not that which is granted to us, but that which is denied; hence it is added by Aristotle in the definition, that something else different from the things admitted necessarily happens. On this account, the formulae of the Stoics are superfluous, which dissimilarly conclude that which is not the same: as, Either it is day, or it is night; but it is day. The doubling likewise the same thing is superfluous: as, If it is day, it is day; therefore it is day. For they in vain collect what is spontaneously granted without controversy. But when I say, If it is day, there is light; but it is day, and therefore there is light; it is more probable, that I do not badly infer something else than what was granted to me.

For the assertion there is light, which is in the conclusion, was also in the proposition. Nevertheless, we may confute this by saying, that the assertion therefore there is light, is enunciated in one way in the conclusion, as showing that there is now light; and was assumed in another way in the proposition, in which it is not said that there is now light, but it only follows that if it is day, there will also be light.

It makes, however, a great difference whether you affirm that a certain thing is, or that it only is accustomed to be, when something else precedes. Likewise that which is necessarily comprehended in the same definition, is distinguished by the power of the conclusion from the similitude of induction. For in induction certain things are granted: as for instance, Man moves his lower jaw, and so does a horse, an ox, and a dog. From these things being granted, something else is inferred in the conclusion; as, Therefore every animal moves its lower jaw; which, as it is false in the crocodile, you may, the preceding things being granted, refuse to admit the inference, which it was not lawful for you to refuse in the conclusion. For the inference is comprehended in the things previously admitted, and therefore it is added in it, that it necessarily takes place, lest the last part of the definition should be deficient. But it shows from the very same things which were admitted, that the conclusion ought to be inferred, though unless they are admitted, it will not be certain. Of these particulars, however, enough has been said.

It is now, however, requisite to show what the modes and conjugations are, by which true conclusions are produced within a certain number of the predicative genus. For in the first figure, there are found only nine modes and six conjugations. But in the second figure, there are four modes and three combinations. And in the third figure, six modes and five conjugations; the peculiarities of which I shall

demonstrate in, their proper order; previously observing that a legitimate, conclusion cannot be produced, either from particular propositions alone, or from such as are negative alone, because from them false inferences may frequently be deduced. Besides, if one negative is added to many affirmative propositions, a negative, and not an affirmative conclusion will be produced; so that the mixture of one negative proposition will predominate over the rest. Similar to this also is the power of particular propositions. For a particular mixed with universal propositions makes a particular conclusion. In the first formula or figure, therefore, first mode is that which produces directly a universal affirmative conclusion, from universal affirmative premises; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Every thing honest is good;

Therefore, every thing just is good

But if you conclude indirectly, A certain good therefore is just, the fifth mode is produced from the same combination. For I have above taught, that an universal affirmative proposition can thus alone be converted.

The second mode [of the first figure] is that which produces directly an universal negative conclusion from universal propositions, one of which is affirmative, and the other negative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Nothing that is honest is base;

Therefore, nothing that is just is base.

But if you conclude inversely, Therefore, nothing base is just, you will produce the sixth mode. For, As it has been already observed, an universal negative proposition is converted into

itself. But we ought to remember, that the subject is to be assumed from the affirmative proposition, in order to conclude in the second mode; and that on this account it is to be considered as prior, though the negative proposition is enunciated before it. In a similar manner also in the other modes, the proposition which is prior in power is understood to be the first in order. But in the sixth mode, the subject is assumed from a negative proposition. And this is the only difference between them.

The third mode [of the first figure] is that which concludes directly a particular affirmative from a particular and an universal affirmative; as,

Something just is honest;

Every thing honest is useful;

Therefore, something just is useful.

But if you conclude inversely, Therefore, something useful is just, you will produce the seventh mode. For, as we have before observed, an affirmative particular proposition is converted into itself.

The fourth mode [of the first figure] is that which infers directly a particular negative, from a particular affirmative and an universal negative; as",

Something just is honest;

Nothing honest is base;

Therefore, something just is not base.

From this mode conversions are found contrary to the former modes. For the eighth and ninth modes preserve the conclusion of this mode, but not inversely like the former modes. For they only invert the conjugation through equivalent propositions, and in a converse order, so that the negative becomes the prior proposition. And on this account,

both are said to conclude through a conversion of the conjugation. For if you convert the universal negative of the fourth mode, and subject to [or place after] it the universal affirmative, from which being inverted the particular affirmative was formed, the eighth mode will be produced, which infers indirectly a particular negative from two universal propositions, one of which is negative, but the other affirmative; as, Nothing base is honest; Every thing honest is just; Therefore, something just is not base.

The ninth mode also, through a similar conversion, infers indirectly a negative particular from an universal negative and a particular affirmative; as, Nothing base is honest; Something honest is just; Therefore, something just is not base.

The reason, however, why the fourth mode alone produces two other modes, but each of the rest only one other mode, is this, that, if we convert both the propositions of the first mode, an ineffectual conjugation of two particular propositions will be produced: but if we convert one of them alone, either the second or the third figure will be produced. Thus also, if you convert both the propositions of the second mode, the conjugation of the ninth will be produced, which, as we have already shown, is generated from the fourth mode, because the universal affirmative of the second mode cannot be converted, except particularly; but if you alone convert one of the propositions, the second or the third figure will be produced, From among these nine modes, therefore, of the first figure, the four first are denominated indemonstrable; not because they cannot be demonstrated, as is the case with the wholeness of the sea, which is not demonstrable; and the quadrature of the circle; but because they are so simple, and so manifest, that they do not require to be demonstrated; so as that they may produce the rest, and impart credibility to

them from themselves.

Now, therefore, let us deliver the modes of the second figure. The first mode in this figure, is that which infers directly an universal negative from an universal affirmative and an universal negative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Nothing base is honest;

Therefore, nothing just is base.

This mode is reduced to the second indemonstrable mode, by converting the second proposition of it.

The second mode is that which infers directly an universal negative from two universal propositions, the one negative, but the other affirmative; as,

Nothing base is honest;

Every thing just is honest;

Therefore, nothing base is just.

This mode does not differ in conjugation from the former mode, except that it derives the subjective particle [or the subject of the conclusion] from a negative proposition, because the order of the enunciation is so changed that it cannot be employed in the first figure.

The third mode is that which infers directly a particular negative from a particular affirmative and an universal negative; as,

Something just is honest;

Nothing base is honest;

Therefore, something just is not base.

If we convert the universal negative of this mode, the fourth indemonstrable mode will be produced, from which this

originates.

The fourth mode is that which infers directly a particular negative, from a particular negative and an universal affirmative; as,

Something just is not base;

Every thing evil is base;

Therefore, something just is not evil.

This is the only mode in the second figure which is demonstrated through the impossible; of which proposition we shall speak when we have explained the modes of the third figure. —

In the third figure the first mode O is that which, from two universal affirmatives, infers, both directly and inversely, a particular affirmative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Every thing just is good;

Therefore, something honest is good.

Or thus, Therefore, something good is honest. For it is of no consequence which you make the subjective particle from those two propositions, because it is of no consequence which you enunciate first. Hence Theophrastus was not right in thinking that, on this account, this mode is not one only, but two.

The second mode [of this third figure] is that which infers directly a particular affirmative, from a particular and universal affirmative; as,

Something just is honest;

Every thing just is good;

Therefore, something honest is good.

The third mode is that which infers directly a particular affirmative, from an universal and particular affirmative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Something just is good;

Therefore, something good is honest.

The fourth mode is that which infers directly a negative particular from an universal affirmative and an universal negative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Nothing just is evil;

Therefore, something honest is not evil.

The fifth mode infers directly a negative particular, from an affirmative particular and an universal negative; as, Something just is honest; Nothing just is evil; Therefore, something honest is not evil.

And the sixth mode infers directly a particular negative from an universal affirmative and a particular negative; as,

Every thing just is honest;

Something just is not evil;

Therefore, something honest is not evil.

Of these six modes, the three first are reduced to the third indemonstrable, by converting the prior proposition of the first and second. The third has the same conjugation with the second, differing only in this one thing, that it derives its subjective particle [or the subject of its conclusion] from an universal proposition. On this account it is reduced to the third indemonstrable, not only by a conversion of proposition, but also of conclusion. The fourth, likewise, and fifth modes, originate from the fourth indemonstrable, by converting their prior propositions. But the sixth mode cannot be reduced to

any indemonstrable, neither by a conversion of both nor of one of its propositions; but it is alone demonstrated through the impossible, in the same manner as the fourth mode in the second figure, and on this account both are the last that are enumerated. The order, however, of the rest, in all the figures, is made according to the difference of the conjugations and conclusions. For, because affirmation is prior to negation, and the universal is more powerful than the particular, the universal is prior to the particular conclusions, and in both the modes affirmation and the conclusion are similar; and that mode precedes which is more swiftly reduced to the indemonstrable, i.e. by one conversion, which is one proof that those modes are certain in their conclusions.

There is also another demonstration common to all the modes, and likewise to the indemonstrables, which is called demonstration through the impossible, and is denominated by the Stoics the first constitution, or the first exposition, and which they thus define: If a certain third thing is inferred from two other things, one of them, with the contrary of the conclusion, infers the contrary of that which remains. But the ancients define it as follows: If the inference of any conclusion is subverted, one of the propositions being assumed, the other will be subverted. Which thing was invented against those, who, though they admit the premises, yet impudently deny that which is inferred from them. For through this definition they are reduced to impossibilities, since, from what they deny, something contrary to that which preceded is found to take place. Moreover, it is impossible that contraries should be, at one and the same time, true. Hence they are compelled, through what is impossible, to admit the conclusion. Nor have those who are skilled in dialectic in vain established that to be the true mode, in which the contrary of the conclusion, together with one of the premises, confutes the other. The Stoics, indeed, think that the conclusion is denied, or one of

the premises confuted, by the negative particle only being prefixed; such, for instance, as, every not every; a certain thing, not a certain thing. Eight contrary arguments, therefore, are produced, which are opposed to each conclusion, because each of the premises is subverted in a twofold respect, and twice four conclusions are formed; at one time a negative particle being prefixed to the inference, but at another the contradictory of the conclusion being assumed. Let the first indemonstrable mode be for an example.

Every thing just is honest;

Every thing honest is good;

Therefore, every thing just is good.

He who denies this conclusion, the premises being granted, must necessarily say, Something just is not good. If you place before this the former of the two premises, viz. Every thing just is honest, the conclusion will be made according to the sixth mode of the third figure, Therefore, something honest is not good; and this is repugnant to the second proposition, which granted that Every thing honest is good. This conclusion also will be entirely contrary, if, the same things remaining, you infer its equivalent; as, Therefore, not every thing honest is good. In like manner, two other conclusions will be produced, if, in the same way as we have now proposed the prior proposition, we assume the posterior, viz. Something just is not good; every thing honest is good; for two conclusions of the fourth mode of the second figure will be produced, viz. Therefore, not every thing just is honest; or, Therefore, something just is not honest. And each of these will be equally repugnant to the former proposition, which granted that Everything just is honest. But, these four conclusions remaining, the proposition only being changed, if, in the place of the premise, which was, Something just is not

good, you make it to be, Not every thing just is good, so that the inference may be subverted in a twofold respect, there will be four other conclusions with the same mutations.

Also, if, instead of the same proposition, you make the premise to be, Nothing just is good, so that the inference may be subverted in a threefold respect, four other conclusions, making a third four, will be formed, in those syllogisms alone which will have an universal conclusion; for these alone can be subverted in a threefold respect; but in the others there are only eight, which may be separately formed in the several modes through all the figures, according to the example which we have proposed.

Moreover, by the assistance of letters, as in [mathematical] hypothesis, the order of the propositions and the parts being inverted, but their power remaining, let the first indemonstrable mode be,

A is affirmed of every B,

And B of every C;

Therefore, A also must be affirmed of every C.

They begin from the attribute, and, on this account, from the second proposition. This mode, which is thus formed, is inversely as follows:

Every C is B;

Every B is A;

Therefore, every C is A.

But the Stoics employ numbers in the place of letters; as,

If the first [is admitted, then] the second;

But the first [is admitted];

Therefore, the second.

Aristotle, however, delivers only four indemonstrable modes in the first figure; but Theophrastus and others enumerate five: for they add the indefinite proposition, and collect the indefinite conclusion. This it is superfluous to discuss, since the indefinite is assumed for the particular, and there will be the same modes as there are from particular propositions. Besides, we have already exhibited four modes in the first figure, which, if any one wishes to double, assuming the indefinite for the particular, and subjoining the indefinite conclusion, all the modes will be twenty-nine.

Aristo, however, the Alexandrian, and some more recent Peripatetics, have, besides these, introduced five other modes of particular instead of universal conclusion three in the first figure, and two in the second. But it is most absurd for him to whom more is conceded, to infer less. It is demonstrated, however, that there are only nineteen certain modes in the three formulae [or figures] of them, which we have above exhibited. For there are four propositions, two of which are particular, and two universal. Each of these, as Aristotle says, is conjoined in four modes, so that it is subjected to itself, and placed before the three others; and thus there will be in each figure sixteen conjugations. Of these, six are equally useless in all the figures; two indeed, when one of the negative propositions precedes the other [and also itself]; but four when either of the particular propositions, either precedes itself, or is subjoined to the other. For nothing can be concluded, wherever there are two particulars, or two negatives. There will remain therefore to each figure ten conjugations.

Moreover, two of these are useless, as well in the first as in the second figure; viz when an universal precedes a particular affirmative. In a similar manner also in the first and third figure, two are rejected, in which a particular negative

antecedes either of the affirmative propositions. Hence, there will remain six conjugations of the first figure, but in nine modes. And in the other two figures, there will still be eight modes; of which one is not allowed in either, when an universal negative precedes a particular affirmative. Again, of these seven conjugations which remain, there are four which are particularly false in the second figure; viz when an universal affirmative is conjoined either with itself, or with its own particular proposition, and this in any order you please; or when one of these precedes. Besides, there are two that are peculiarly useless in the third figure; when either of the negative propositions precedes an universal affirmative. And we have before shown, that there are three certain conjugations in the second, but five in the third figure, when we reduced them to the six conjugations of the first figure. Hence, of the forty-eight conjugations, fourteen only are allowed. But the remaining thirty-four which I have enumerated, are very properly rejected, because they are capable of inferring what is false from what is true; which may be easily proved in those five above-mentioned significations of genus, peculiarity, &c. The conclusions themselves, however, show, that not more modes than those which have been before enumerated, can be produced from the fourteen conjugations which we have demonstrated; whether the conclusions are assumed directly or inversely, so far as truth suffers this to take place. And hence, the number of them cannot be increased.

THE END